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Can the Television and Movie Industries Avoid the 
Copyright Battles of the Recording Industry? Fair Use 
and Visual Works on the Internet  
Katherine M. Lieb∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Against an underscore of the opening lyrics of I Fought the Law, a 
female teenager appears on the screen and announces, “Hi, I’m one 
of the kids who was prosecuted for downloading music free off of the 
internet, and I’m here to announce in front of 100 million people that 
we are still going to download music free off of the internet. And 
there’s not a thing anyone can do about it.”1 Premiering during Super 
Bowl XXXVIII, this scene, taken from an Apple Computer 
advertisement, mocks the music industry’s attempts to prevent illegal 
downloads of music from the internet.2 
The music industry has been vigorous in its attempts to defend its 
copyrights against infringement by sharers of MP3s.3 Against this 
onslaught of litigation, music sharers have utilized the fair use 
defense, which creates an exception under which a person may 
 ∗ B.A., Theatre and History (2002), College of William and Mary; J.D. Candidate 
(2005), Washington University School of Law. 
 1. silicon.com, The Weekly Round-Up: 06.02.04, at http:/comment.silicon.com/ 
weeklyroundup/0,39024756,39118223,00.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2005). 
 2. See Stuart Elliott, During Breaks in Game, Satire and Silliness, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 
2004, at C1.  
 3. See, e.g., A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); UMG 
Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). An MP3 is a digitally 
compressed audio file that is easily transferable via email or other electronic transfer medium. 
See A & M Records, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1011. Through a process called ripping, a computer 
owner can compress the audio information stored on a compact disc into the MP3 format, and 
the MP3 files can then be stored on or transferred from the computer’s hard drive. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
P233 Lieb book pages.doc  4/11/2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
234 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 17:233 
 
 
 
legally copy and sample works for purposes “such as criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for 
classroom use), scholarship, or research.”4 
As video clips increasingly appear on the internet,5 alleged 
copyright infringers of this medium have also begun to use the fair 
use defense. This situation justifiably creates concern for the movie 
and television industries as the availability of their copyrighted work 
on the internet increases.6 
Two recent federal court of appeals decisions attempted to 
formulate standards for permitting the fair use defense to be used in 
the internet context. In Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home 
Entertainment, Inc.,7 the Third Circuit held that Video Pipeline’s 
online internet display of “clip previews,” unauthorized compilations 
of segments of the defendants’ movies, did not constitute “fair use.”8 
Video Pipeline, an independent distributor of videos, created its own 
trailer-like previews of copyrighted works for viewing on the 
internet.9 Various entertainment companies who owned the 
copyrights to these works brought a copyright infringement action 
against Video Pipeline.10 Video Pipeline argued that its use of the clip 
previews constituted fair use because the previews substantially 
transformed the original films and the purpose of the clips was 
 4. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).  
 5. The movie industry estimated it had about eighteen months “before high-speed 
Internet access and high-capacity hard drives make grabbing a movie almost as quick and easy 
as grabbing a song.” John Schwartz, In Chasing Movie Pirates, Hollywood Treads Lightly, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2003, at C1. Despite the current longer download periods, internet users 
have been downloading movies for the past few years. See Lee Gomes, Now, the 
‘Napsterization’ of Movies, WALL ST. J., July 17, 2000, at B1. Because digital files for movies 
are significantly larger and take longer to download than music files, the movie and television 
industries believed that they would be immune from such dangers. However, due to the ability 
to compress files and the increase in broadband networking and file sharing, the movie industry 
quickly began to face the same problems as the music industry. As Lee Gomes succinctly 
declared: “Hollywood, your nightmare is here.” Id. 
 6. See Robert S. Boynton, The Tyranny of Copyright, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2004, § 6 
(Magazine), at 42 (“In less than a decade, the much-ballyhooed liberating potential of the 
internet seems to have given way to something of an intellectual land grab.”). 
 7. 342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1410 (2004). 
 8. Id. at 203.  
 9. Id. at 195–96.  
 10. Id. at 196. 
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different than the original works.11 Video Pipeline based its argument 
on the successful employment of the fair use defense in Kelly v. 
Arriba Soft Corp.12 In Kelly, the Ninth Circuit held that the online 
display of thumbnail-size pictures for a search engine constituted fair 
use.13 Video Pipeline compared its display of the clip previews to the 
use of pictures on Arriba Soft’s search engine.14 
Video Pipeline emerged against a backdrop of debate concerning 
current copyright laws and their applicability to the internet.15 
Proponents of more liberal copyright laws justify their position by the 
extensive amount of information available on the internet and the 
need for an abundant public domain. They also advocate the 
expansion of the fair use defense for copyright infringers on the 
internet.16 Opponents of liberal copyright laws counter that the 
traditional copyright scheme will sufficiently protect authors whose 
copyrighted works surface on the internet.17 
This Note examines Video Pipeline in the context of this debate. 
Part I examines the history of the fair use doctrine and how it has 
evolved with the emergence of the internet. Part II discusses Video 
Pipeline and compares it to other fair use cases involving visual 
works and the internet. Part III focuses on both the entertainment 
industry’s and scholars’ arguments for and against enhanced 
copyright protection on the internet. Part IV, concludes that, given 
the current statutory arrangement and previous case law, Video 
Pipeline constitutes an appropriate curb on the fair use defense. It 
also concludes that while the decision was a major victory for the 
movie and television industry, it also served as an appropriate 
protection of authors’ rights. 
 11. Id. at 198.  
 12. 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).  
 13. Id. at 822.  
 14. Video Pipeline, 342 F.3d at 199. 
 15. See Boynton, supra note 6, at 40. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See infra notes 106–07 and text accompanying note 107. 
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I. HISTORY OF FAIR USE 
A. Four-Factor Test 
The fair use defense emerged as a response to the “tension in the 
need simultaneously to protect copyrighted material and to allow 
others to build upon it.”18 In the 1976 Copyright Act,19 Congress 
codified prior fair use case law that established the fair use defense 
and created four statutory factors used to determine whether the 
defense applied.20 Since this codification, the Supreme Court has 
handed down a line of four major fair use decisions that provide a 
framework for examining these four factors.21 Analysis of these 
factors “is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, 
like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis.”22 The 
factors must therefore be viewed “in light of the purposes of 
copyright”23 to encourage “creative activity.”24  
The first factor examines “the purpose and character of the use, 
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes.”25 The critical analysis involves an 
investigation of whether the work adds a new purpose or character 
and changes the message or meaning of the original work, thus 
making the work “transformative.”26 As the transformative nature of 
the work increases, the remaining three factors become less 
important.27 
 18. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994). 
 19. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 101 (codified as amended as 17 U.S.C.). 
 20. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
 21. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 569; Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990); Harper & 
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 22. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577; see also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560.  
 23. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578. 
 24. Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 429. 
 25. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2000); see also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562 (“The fact that a 
publication was commercial as opposed to nonprofit is a separate factor that tends to weigh 
against a finding of fair use.”). 
 26. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
 27. Id.; see also, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 
2003). In Mattel, Walking Mountain photographed Mattel’s well-known and copyrighted doll, 
Barbie. Id. at 796. The photographs featured Barbie in a series of “various absurd and often 
sexualized positions” in an attempt to “critique[] the objectification of women associated with 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol17/iss1/9
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The second factor examines “the nature of the copyrighted 
work.”28 This factor considers the work’s medium and whether such 
medium “falls within the core of the copyright’s protective 
purposes.”29 
The third factor examines “the amount and substantiality of the 
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.”30 This 
examination is not concerned with the quantity of the materials 
sampled, but instead focuses on the quality or importance of the 
copied materials.31 
The fourth factor examines “the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”32 This factor 
involves an examination of both the potential for economic harm to 
the copyrighted work caused by the infringer and the likely 
accumulated effect on the market if others participated in similar 
widespread conduct.33 
[Barbie], and [] [to] lambast[] the conventional beauty myth and the societal acceptance of 
women as objects because this is what Barbie embodies.” Id. (alteration in original). Walking 
Mountain featured the photographs in art exhibits, on business cards, and on its webpage. Id. at 
796–97. The court found its photographs to be “extremely transformative” and found that the 
first factor weighed heavily for a finding of fair use. Id. at 803. The court found that the second 
factor also weighed for a finding of fair use because the nature of the copied work was 
expressive and publicly known. Id. Despite a finding against fair use for both the third and 
fourth factors, the court emphasized the creative and transformative aspect of Walking 
Mountain’s photographs and held that its use of the copyrighted dolls was fair. Id. at 803–06. 
 28. § 107(2). 
 29. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586. “This factor calls for recognition that some works are 
closer to the core of intended copyright protection than others, with the consequence that fair 
use is more difficult to establish when the former works are copied.” Id. Additionally, the 
published or unpublished quality of the work is an important consideration in assessing this 
factor. See Harper & Row, Publishers, 471 U.S. at 564.  
 30. § 107(3).  
 31. See Harper & Row, Publishers, 471 U.S. at 564–66. 
 32. § 107(4). 
 33. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590. Additionally, this factor must be viewed in light of the 
purpose and character of the work. If a court finds that the work is greatly transformative, a 
court will likely hold that the copied work will not function as a market replacement or cause a 
diminution in value of the first work. Id. at 591. Under this factor, the Mattel court also looked 
to whether the plaintiff would normally license the use of its copyright to the defendant to 
engage in the defendant’s activities. Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 
805 (9th Cir. 2003). The court found that it was highly unlikely that Mattel would allow 
Walking Mountain to create art using its dolls in sexualized positions. Therefore, market 
competition and loss of profits could not be presumed from the plaintiff’s failure to license. Id.; 
see also Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc. 964 F.2d 965, 971 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(“[T]he likelihood of future harm may not be presumed.”). David Nimmer analyzes all of the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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B. Fair Use and Edited Film 
The author of a copyrighted work is allowed to copy and integrate 
the work into derivative works.34 Previous cases recognized that 
movie trailers constitute derivative works.35 Even if the copyright 
holder of the full-length movie does not copyright the trailer 
individually, the trailer will still acquire copyright protection as a 
derivative work of the full-length movie.36 
However, courts have generally allowed the fair use defense with 
copied video clips when such use is for the public interest. Courts 
typically find fair use when the copied clips are used in 
documentaries,37 biographies,38 and news programs.39  
copyright cases decided since the last Supreme Court decision analyzing fair use. See David 
Nimmer, “Fairest of Them All” and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 263 (2003). Of these holdings, Nimmer found that: 
(1) The first factor corresponds to the conclusion of fair use fifty-five percent of the 
time; (2) The second factor corresponds to the conclusion of fair use forty-two percent 
of the time; (3) The third factor corresponds to the conclusion of fair use fifty-seven 
percent of the time; (4) The fourth factor corresponds to the conclusion of fair use fifty 
percent of the time; (5) The cumulative correspondence for all four factors is slightly 
under fifty-one percent. 
Id. at 280. However, ninety percent of the time, judges will find fair use when three out of four 
factors point to such a finding. Nimmer finds that such a difference in numbers is derived from 
the malleability of the four-factor test. Id. 
 34. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 220 (1990). Congress defines a derivative work 
as a “work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a . . . motion picture. . . . [a] 
work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, 
as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a ‘derivative work.’” 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 35. See Lamb v. Starks, 949 F. Supp. 753, 756 (N.D. Cal. 1996). 
 36. Id. In Lamb, Starks copied Lamb’s movie trailer, which had not been copyrighted. Id. 
at 755. However, Lamb copyrighted the full-length movie, from which the movie trailer was 
derived. In rejecting Stark’s fair use argument, the court found that the movie trailer was a 
derivative work of the full length movie and Stark’s commercial profit from the use of the 
trailer, the commercial purpose of the work, and the copying of the movie trailer in its entirety 
weighed against a finding of fair use. Id. at 757. 
 37. See generally Hofheinz v. AMC Prods., Inc., 147 F. Supp. 2d 127 (E.D.N.Y. 2001). In 
Hofheinz, the court found fair use when AMC used clips of Hofheinz’s copyrighted films in a 
documentary. Id. at 141. The documentary discussed the lives of B-movie actors, Sam Arkoff 
and James Nicholson. Id. at 130. The court focused on the varying purposes of the movie and 
the documentary. Id. at 137. The court reasoned that while Hofheinz’s films intended to 
entertain their audiences, AMC’s documentary aimed “to educate the viewing public of the 
impact that Arkoff and Nicholson had on the movie industry.” Id.; see also Monster 
Communications, Inc. v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (denying 
plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction against defendant, thus holding that defendant’s 
unauthorized copying of plaintiff’s film footage for a television documentary was likely fair use 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol17/iss1/9
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C. Fair Use and Visual Images on the Internet 
The posting of copyrighted motion pictures and visual images on 
the internet infringes the copyright holders’ exclusive right to display 
and to distribute copies of the copyrighted work to the public.40 
Courts have specifically dealt with this issue in the context of the 
unauthorized posting of edited clips of adult videotapes and other 
photographs on the internet.  
In Michaels v. Internet Entertainment Group, Inc.,41 Michaels 
sought to enjoin the Internet Entertainment Group (IEG) from posting 
segments of videotapes containing images from Michaels’s adult 
because the film’s subject, Muhammed Ali, was of significant public interest). 
 38. In a companion case to Hofheinz, the court similarly held that the use of film clips 
featuring actor Peter Graves in a biography aired on A&E’s cable television station constituted 
fair use. Hofheinz v. A & E Television Networks, 146 F. Supp. 2d 442 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). The 
film clips were originally featured in a movie trailer and were later copied into A&E’s 
biography program. Id. at 443–44. Although A&E produced the work for a commercial 
audience and for a profit, the court found that the work constituted fair use because of its 
educational purpose. Id. at 446. The court also recognized that the appearance of Graves in the 
film constituted a fact of his life and therefore enriched the biography. Id. at 446–47. However, 
the Ninth Circuit limited the biography exception in Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. Passport 
Video, 349 F.3d 622 (9th Cir. 2003). Although the court recognized some transformative 
elements of the video clips in the biography, it did not find fair use because: Passport Video’s 
use of the clips was purely commercial; Passport Video repeated the copyrighted clips 
throughout the documentary; and widespread use of the clips without Elvis Presley Enterprise’s 
grant of a license would cause a decline in the market for such licenses. Id. at 627–31.  
 39. The court reaffirmed this doctrine in Video-Cinema Films, Inc. v. CNN, Inc., 2001 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15937 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2001). In Video Cinema, the defendants were 
television corporations who aired sections of Video Cinema’s copyrighted movie, G.I. Joe, in 
an obituary segment on actor Robert Mitchum. Id. at *5–14. Because news reporting is clearly a 
fair use exception delineated in the copyright act, the court found that there was a strong 
presumption in favor of fair use. Id. at *19. Additionally, the court found that the defendants’ 
inclusion of the clip in the obituary was for a purpose distinguishable from Video Cinema’s use 
in the original movie. “While Plaintiff’s copyrighted work intended to entertain its audience, as 
well as to inform them of the reality that American infantrymen faced in World War II, 
Defendants’ obituaries aimed to inform the viewing public of Mitchum’s death and educate 
them regarding his impact on the arts.” Id. at *20–21; see also Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t 
Employees/Int’l Bhd. of Police Officers v. BUCI Television, Inc., 118 F. Supp. 2d 126 (D. 
Mass. 2000). However, the fact that a news program uses an edited clip is not always 
determinative of the issue. See, e.g., Los Angeles News Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 
F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding evidence sufficient to find that broadcast of the 
Reginald Denny beating did not constitute fair use of copyrighted videotape because 
defendant’s use did not transform the work or use the work in a different way than if the 
defendant had actually licensed the film from the plaintiff). 
 40. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc. 991 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Tex. 1997). 
 41. 5 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal. 1998).  
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videotapes on the internet.42 IEG argued that the clips would be used 
“in connection with reporting and comment on the newsworthiness 
of” their content.43 In rejecting IEG’s argument, the court found that 
IEG’s use of the tapes was solely commercial and that any 
commentary within the tapes did not change the commercial 
character of the use.44 Furthermore, the court found that IEG’s use of 
the copyrighted materials in short segments or still images was a 
common practice within the adult entertainment industry45 and that 
therefore such use would be “consistent with its commercial 
purpose.”46 The remaining three factors also weighed against IEG’s 
proposed use..47  
In Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.,48 Arriba Soft created a search engine 
that displayed thumbnail images for each query.49 A user could gain 
full access to the featured webpage after clicking on the thumbnail 
 42. Id. at 828–29. 
 43. Id. at 834–35. 
 44. Id. 
 45.  Id. at 835.  
 46. Id. The court distinguished IEG’s use with that of clips of motion pictures used on 
television for the purpose of criticism by stating: 
Display of such short segments is fair use because it does not conflict with the form of 
display that is valuable to the copyright owner—display of the entire motion picture in 
a theater. Here, on the other hand, because of the nature of the adult entertainment 
business on the Internet, the commercial value of the Tape lies as much in the display 
of brief images as in display of the entire Tape.  
Id. 
 47. Id. at 836. The court stated that because the work was unpublished and because “it 
does not seem likely that the portrayal of two people engaged in sexual relations on the Tape 
constitutes a set of facts or ideas whose discussion requires seeing the Tape,” the second factor 
weighed against IEG. Id. at 835. Furthermore, the court found that the third and fourth factors 
weighed against a finding of fair use because the tape’s value as adult entertainment derived 
from the still images and because the nature of the internet could lead to the clip’s widespread 
dissemination. Id. at 835–36.  
 48. 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 49. Id. at 815. Unlike most search engines, Arriba Soft’s engine did not display text to 
accompany the query. Id. To obtain these pictures, Arriba Soft created a computer program to 
scan the internet for available images. Id. The program downloaded the images onto its server 
to create the thumbnail versions. Id. Once the thumbnail image was created, the program 
deleted the image from its hard drive. Id. When a user linked to another webpage through the 
thumbnail image, the new webpage would be displayed with additional attributes from the 
Arriba Soft site (including the Arriba banner and Arriba advertising). Id. at 816. This practice, 
in-line linking, incorporates the additional webpage into the search engine’s own content, 
hiding the fact that the accessed image is on an entirely separate webpage. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol17/iss1/9
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image.50 Kelly, a photographer holding the copyrights to some of the 
featured images, brought an action for copyright infringement against 
Arriba Soft for its use of his photographs.51 
The court held that the fair use doctrine covered Arriba Soft’s 
actions.52 Although Arriba Soft operated the web site for commercial 
purposes, the court found that its use was not exploitative because it 
did not use the images to promote its website or to make a profit 
through the images’ sale.53 The court observed that the use was 
transformative because Arriba Soft used lower-resolution images that 
served a separate purpose from Kelly’s original works.54 It also 
reasoned that the use of the images was consistent with the purposes 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 822. Following the lead of the district court, the Ninth Circuit divided Kelly’s 
claims into two separate issues. Id. at 817. First, whether the reproduction of the thumbnail 
images on the search engine violated Kelly’s copyright. The court examined this issue in detail 
and held that the fair use exception applied. Id. at 822. Second, whether after the user has 
double-clicked on the thumbnail image, Arriba Soft’s banner and advertising surrounding the 
larger image violated Kelly’s right “to display the work publicly” and if yes, whether Arriba 
Soft’s use was fair. Id. at 817. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendant as 
to this second question and held that the use of the in-line linking was fair. In reversing the 
district court’s summary judgment on this issue, the Ninth Circuit initially found Arriba Soft 
violated Kelly’s right of public display. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934, 947 (9th Cir. 
2002). Sitting en banc, the Ninth Circuit withdrew this opinion because neither party moved for 
summary judgment on this second holding in the district court proceedings. Kelly, 336 F.3d at 
822. Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings to 
focus on the in-line linking. Id.  
 53. Id. at 818. The Ninth Circuit also compared the commercial nature of the search 
engine to other kinds of commercial use, finding that the search engine was “more incidental 
and less exploitative in nature than more traditional types of commercial use.” Id. The court 
emphasized that Kelly’s images were among thousands of images available to the search engine 
user. The court concluded that the commercial nature “weighs only slightly against a finding of 
fair use.” Id.  
 54. Id. at 818. The court found that the purpose of Kelly’s original works was to provide 
an “aesthetic experience” for the viewer. Id. In contrast to this aesthetic purpose, Arriba Soft’s 
use served “to help index and improve access to images on the internet and their related web 
sites.” Id. Because of the lower resolution and the resulting lower clarity of the thumbnail 
images, viewers were unlikely to enlarge the thumbnails for aesthetic viewing. The court 
rejected Kelly’s argument that because the images were replicated without additional 
modifications, Arriba Soft’s use could not be transformative. Id. at 818–19. Despite its holding, 
the Ninth Circuit recognized that most courts reject a fair use defense where the work is 
identically reproduced in a different medium. Id. at 819; see also, e.g., L.A. News Serv. v. 
Reuters T.V. Int’l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding no transformation when there is 
an absence of editing, commentary, or explanatory statements); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. 
MP3.Com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that the transmission of 
audio recordings through MP3 format was not transformative). 
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of the Copyright Act because the thumbnails neither “stifle[d] artistic 
creativity”55 nor “supplant[ed] the need for the originals.”56  
Even though the works were already published on the internet, the 
court found that the second factor, “the nature of the copyrighted 
work,” weighed slightly in favor of Kelly because of the creative 
nature of the photographs.57 The court noted that the third factor 
favored neither party because, although Arriba Soft copied the image 
in its entirety, the extent of the copying was necessary to advance the 
usefulness of the webpage.58 Finally, under the fourth factor, the 
court noted that while Arriba Soft commercially benefited from the 
use of the images on its webpage,59 there was no commercial harm to 
Kelly.60 Finding that the first and fourth factor weighed heavily for 
Arriba Soft, the second factor weighed slightly for Kelly, and the 
 55. Kelly, 336 F.3d at 820.  
 56. Id. The court found that the indexing function of the thumbnail images actually 
enhanced the public’s ability to access information. Id. 
 57. Id. As this factor considers how near the core of copyright protection the infringed 
medium stands, photographs that “are meant to be viewed by the public for informative and 
aesthetic purposes, such as Kelly’s, are generally creative in nature.” Id. Additionally, the court 
argued that another’s use of the work is more likely to be fair when the work has already been 
published, based on Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564 
(1985). Because Kelly’s photographs had already appeared on the internet prior to Arriba Soft’s 
use of them, the published nature of the work weighs against fair use. Id. at 820. 
 58. Kelly, 336 F.3d at 821. While the court recognized that copying the work in its 
entirety usually weighs heavily against a finding of fair use, the purpose of the copying here—
to allow the user to recognize the image—required that the full image be copied. The usefulness 
of the thumbnail would have greatly decreased if Arriba Soft had copied less of the image. Id.; 
see also Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1118 (9th Cir. 
2000) (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 
1986) (“‘While wholesale copying does not preclude fair use per se,’ copying an entire work 
‘militates against a finding of fair use.’”)). 
 59. Kelly, 336 F.3d at 821. Kelly used the photographs to attract visitors to his website. 
On his webpage, Kelly sold advertising space, books, and travel packages. Kelly also sold and 
licensed his photographs to other websites and stock photo databases. Id. 
 60. Id. By displaying Kelly’s photographs, the search engine actually brought more users 
to Kelly’s webpage. First, by viewing the image on the results page, a user is more likely to 
visit Kelly’s webpage. Second, if a user is only interested in the image, the user is still more 
likely to visit Kelly’s webpage for viewing. Because the thumbnail images lose their clarity 
when enlarged, the thumbnail image would not serve as a substitute for the full-size image 
available from Kelly’s webpage. The court noted that “it is extremely unlikely that users would 
download thumbnails for display purposes,” id. at 821 n.37, and that “[t]here would be no way 
to view, create, or sell a clear, full-sized image without going to Kelly’s web sites,” id. at 822. 
Kelly was not limited in his ability to sell or license the images on his webpage by Arriba Soft’s 
use. Id. at 821. As Arriba Soft or any other third party was not able to sell or license the full-
sized images, the market for Kelly’s images remained unchanged. Id. at 821–22.  
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third factor was neutral, the court held that Arriba Soft’s use of the 
images was fair.61 
II. VIDEO PIPELINE, INC. V. BUENA VISTA HOME ENTERTAINMENT62 
Video Pipeline relied heavily on Kelly to advance its fair use 
argument.63 Video Pipeline was a distributor of motion picture 
trailers.64 In 1998, Video Pipeline and Disney entered into an 
agreement establishing Video Pipeline’s right to distribute its movie 
trailers.65 Video Pipeline later created two web pages that displayed 
the trailers.66 Subsequently, Disney asked to have its trailers removed 
 61. Id. at 822.  
 62. 342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1410 (2004). 
 63. Id. at 199; see also Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002). Ty, a 
manufacturer of beanbag stuffed animals, brought a copyright infringement action against 
Publications International (PI), a publisher of collectors’ guides. Id. at 515. PI published a series 
of books featuring photographs of the beanie babies without a license from Ty. PI 
acknowledged that the photographs were a derivative work, but it successfully defended its 
actions under the fair use doctrine. Ty conceded that analogous to a “book review,” a collectors’ 
guide is not a derivative work, but it argued that PI’s photographing of the entire line of beanie 
babies was excessive. Id. at 521. In his decision, Judge Posner emphasized the purpose of the 
fair use doctrine and found that the critical inquiry is “whether it would be unreasonable to 
conclude, with reference to one or more of the enjoined publications, such as the Beanie Babies 
Collector’s Guide, that the use of the photos is a fair use because it is the only way to prepare a 
collectors’ guide.” Id. at 522. In answering this inquiry, Posner emphasized the lack of other 
means available for producing a collectors’ guide without a license (as Ty had previously 
refused to grant a license to PI to manufacture the guide) and that PI copied only what would be 
necessary to produce a “marketable collectors’ guide.” Id. at 521. The court reversed the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment for Ty and remanded the case for further factual findings 
about the collectors’ guides. Id. at 523–24; cf. Batesville Servs., Inc. v. Funeral Depot, Inc., No. 
1:02-CV-01011-DFH-TA, 2004 WL 2750253, at *8–10 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 10, 2004) (rejecting the 
fair use defense argued by a distributor of caskets who used thumbnail images on its webpage 
taken from plaintiff’s advertising materials).  
 64. Video Pipeline, 342 F.3d at 195. To obtain distribution rights, Video Pipeline entered 
into licensing agreements with entertainment companies. It then compiled the individual movie 
trailers onto videotapes to display in retail stores. Id. at 194–95. 
 65. Id. at 195. 
 66. Id. The first webpage, VideoPipeline.net, contained a database of its movie trailers. 
Visitors to online retail chains selling movies could access this webpage through the retail 
website in order to view the movie trailer prior to buying. The online retailers paid a fee for 
access to the site, and because the tapes were streamed to the viewer, a viewer was unable to 
download or store the trailer on her computer. The second webpage, VideoDetective.com, 
allowed visitors to search for a specific movie by the movie’s features. Id. Once the visitor 
conducted the search, the webpage matched movies to the search criteria and provided the 
option to view the movie trailer. The website also allowed visitors to link to an online retailer to 
purchase the full-length movie. Id. 
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from these web pages and Video Pipeline complied with this 
request.67 Video Pipeline later filed a complaint asking for a 
declaratory judgment that the use of the movie trailers did not violate 
copyright law.68 It also replaced the removed trailers with its own 
“clip previews.”69 Video Pipeline amended its complaint to allow 
posting of the clip previews, and Disney counterclaimed for 
copyright infringement.70 Video Pipeline defended its actions as 
protected by the fair use doctrine.71 In its petition for a writ of 
certiorari to the Supreme Court, Video Pipeline argued that the 
collection of clip previews constituted a research guide and type of 
catalog that enabled the public to wade through a massive amount of 
material.72 It stated that the sampling of the copyrighted material was 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. After Video Pipeline removed the trailers and filed the complaint against Disney, 
Disney terminated the license agreement. Id. 
 69. Id. at 195–96. Video Pipeline’s “clip previews” consisted of two minutes of copied 
clips from at least sixty-two Disney movies. Id. “Clip previews” began by showing the 
Miramax or Disney trademark and the movie’s title. Id. at 195. The “clip previews” then 
featured one or two clips from the first half of the movie and closed with the movie’s title. Id. 
Unlike Disney’s own trailers, Video Pipeline’s “clip previews” did not contain marketing 
techniques like narration, editing, or music. Id. at 195–96. 
 70. Id. at 196.  
 71. Id. at 197. In amici briefs submitted by both the Video Software Dealers Association 
and National Association of Recording Merchandisers, the trade associations argued that the 
public interest in acquiring information about a movie prior to purchase weighed against 
Disney’s recovery. Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entertainment, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 
2d 321, 345 (D.N.J. 2002). The district court found this argument to be unwarranted because 
the consumer had other means of accessing information about movies prior to viewing or 
purchasing. Id. at 345–46. 
 72. Appellant’s Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 12, Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista 
Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2003) (No. 03-763). Video Pipeline compared its 
service to other indexing services that utilize portions of copyrighted works. For example, The 
Columbia Granger’s Index to Poetry in Collected and Selected Works is considered the 
definitive source for indexing poetry. Its online subscription equivalent, Grangers Online, 
includes brief excerpts of over 55,000 poems to enable readers to find and access information. 
Id. at 12–13. Additionally, Video Pipeline argued that with the increase of the information 
available on the internet, digital indexing services would become necessary to help the public 
maneuver through the vast amount of information. Id. at 13–14. Video Pipeline also argued that 
certiorari was appropriate given a circuit split over research catalogs. Analogizing the clip 
previews to the collectors’ guides in Ty and the search engine in Kelly, Video Pipeline argued 
that the Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits reached contradictory holdings on the fair use 
doctrine and its applicability to “guides incorporating copyrighted images.” Id. at 9. In response 
to Video Pipeline’s research guide theory, Disney chided Video Pipeline for its introduction of 
a new theory unsupported by the record. Appellee’s Brief in Opposition at 11–12, Video 
Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2003) (No. 03-763). 
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necessary because it provided the public with a truer representation of 
the material that the public sought.73  
A. Fair Use Analysis 
Prior to its fair use analysis, the court noted that unlike most fair 
use analyses, the copied work must be viewed in comparison to both 
the full movie and to the originally produced trailer.74  
1. Purpose and Character of the Work 
Because Video Pipeline charged a fee for viewing the trailers, the 
court found that Video Pipeline’s purpose in putting the clip previews 
online was commercial.75 Although the court acknowledged that the 
purposes of the clip previews and the full-length movies may 
diverge,76 it found that the purposes of the clip previews and the 
original trailers were similar.77 The court also rejected Video 
Pipeline’s analogy to Kelly concerning the storage and searching 
capabilities.78 Moreover, the court found that the clip previews failed 
to add any supplementary creative aspects to Disney’s original 
expression.79 Finally, the court distinguished Video Pipeline’s use of 
Disney argued that Video Pipeline originally defended its use as a means of providing an 
advertising function for retailers to market home videos, and at the intermediate appellate level, 
Video Pipeline defined the clip previews service as a search engine. Id. at 12–14. 
 73. Appellant’s Petition For a Writ of Certiorari at 13–14. 
 74. Video Pipeline, 342 F.3d at 198. In a typical fair use case, the copied work need only 
be compared with the original work. Id.  
 75. Video Pipeline received payment from the online video retailers. Id. at 195. The fee 
was based on the number of megabytes shown to site visitors. Id. 
 76. Id. at 198–99. According to Video Pipeline, the original movies served an “aesthetic 
and entertainment purpose” whereas the clip previews provided information to the viewers. Id. 
 77. Id. at 199. Disney’s trailers were derivative works of its copyrighted movies. Both the 
clip previews and the movie trailers served promotional and informational purposes. Id. The 
court found that the clip previews “likely serve[d] as a substitute for the trailers.” Id. at 200. 
 78. Id. at 199. The court found that the functions of Arriba Soft’s search engine and Video 
Pipeline’s database differed because the latter did “ not improve access to authorized previews 
located on other web sites.” Id. The court recognized that Video Pipeline enabled its viewers to 
link to legitimate web pages to purchase authorized copies, but ultimately ruled that this was 
not indicative of fair use. Id. 
 79. Id. The court found that the selection of the scenes for the clip previews at most 
constituted a creative decision. Id. at 199–200. Video Pipeline itself acknowledged the lack of 
creative elements in the clip previews. Id. at 200. 
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the clip previews from that of a movie review that incorporates movie 
segments into it. In a movie review, the reviewer’s criticisms and 
observations adds transformative and expressive elements to the 
movie clips.80 
2. Nature of the Copyrighted Work 
In regards to the second factor, the court noted that as creative 
works, movies were closer to the heart of works that require 
copyright protection.81 While the court acknowledged that Disney 
had made both the movies and the previews available to the public, it 
held that the expressive and creative nature of the original full-length 
movies and trailers outweighed a finding of fair use.82 
3. Amount and Substantiality of the Work Copied 
The court found that the third factor demonstrated a finding of fair 
use.83 The court noted that Video Pipeline copied a total of a two-
minute segment from the original movie.84 As Video Pipeline only 
reproduced clips from the first half of each movie, the copied 
segments did not reveal the “heart” of the movie and instead provided 
a mere preview of the characters and plot.85 
4. Effect on Potential Market or Value 
The court found that the fourth factor weighed against a finding of 
fair use.86 The court addressed this factor solely by comparing the 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. at 200–01. The court found that Disney’s movies were “paradigms of creative, 
non-factual expression” and that the trailers shared the “imaginative aspects” with the full-
length movies. Id.  
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 201. 
 84. Id. The full-length movies that typically lasted from one and a half to two hours. Id. 
 85. Id. The district court found that the clip previews, “for the most part, were used to 
provide the potential customer with some idea of the plot of each motion picture, its overall 
tone, and a glimpse of its leading characters.” Id. (quoting Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista 
Home Entm’t, 192 F. Supp. 2d 321, 339 (D.N.J. 2002)). The clips “are meant to whet the 
customer’s appetite, not to sate it.” Id. 
 86. Id. at 203.  
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clip previews with the movie trailers.87 Because websites paid Video 
Pipeline for their use of the database, the court found that there was a 
market for the video trailers.88 The court stated that if Video Pipeline 
continued to stream the clip previews over the internet, the clips 
would “‘serve[] as a market replacement’ for the trailers, ‘making it 
likely that cognizable market harm to the [derivatives] will occur.’”89 
If other people engaged in similar conduct, Video Pipeline’s actions 
would have a substantial negative impact on the market for trailers.90 
B. Holding 
The court held that three of the four fair use factors weighed 
against Video Pipeline’s claim of fair use.91 The court’s curbing of 
 87. Id. at 202. The court decided against a comparison of the clip previews with the 
original movies because it believed the analysis with Disney’s trailers would be simpler. Id. 
 88. Id. Video Pipeline argued that there could be no damage to the market for movie 
trailers because there was simply no market for movie trailers. Video Pipeline reasoned that no 
one “ever paid or will ever pay any money merely to see trailers.” Id. The court replied that 
compensation may take a variety of forms. For instance, Disney had made agreements where its 
trailers were cross-linked with the Apple Computer home page. Video Pipeline, 342 F.3d at 
196. Additionally, Disney used “the draw of the availability of authentic trailers to advertise, 
cross-market, and cross-sell other products, and to obtain valuable marketing information from 
visitors who chose to register at the site or make a purchase there.” Id. at 202 (quoting 
Appendix); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 446 n.28 
(1984) (“[C]opyright law does not require a copyright owner to charge a fee for the use of his 
works, and . . . the owner of a copyright may well have economic or noneconomic reasons for 
permitting certain kinds of copying to occur without receiving direct compensation from the 
copier.”). 
 89. Video Pipeline, 342 F.3d at 202–03 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 
U.S. 569, 591 (1994)). If Video Pipeline continued in this fashion, owners of websites wishing 
to feature the previews would enter into licensing agreements with Video Pipeline. Video 
Pipeline, 342 F.3d at 203. These agreements could restrict Disney’s ability to obtain similar 
licensing agreements. The court found that twenty-five retailers had already entered into 
licensing agreements with Video Pipeline. Id. Additionally, the court noted that individual 
internet users may stream Video Pipeline’s clip previews instead of Disney’s trailers. This 
practice deprived “Disney of the opportunity to advertise and sell other products to those users.” 
Id.  
 90. Id. at 203. 
 91. Id. Only the third factor promoted a finding of fair use. Id. at 201. Additionally, Video 
Pipeline used a copyright misuse theory, arguing that licensing agreements entered into by 
Disney with other companies operating web sites misused the copyright laws. Id. at 203. 
Although the court recognized the possibility of such a defense (neither the Supreme Court nor 
the Third Circuit had previously addressed the issue), the court ultimately concluded that this 
defense failed. Id. The court found that Disney would likely suffer “incalculable losses from the 
clip previews’ competition with the trailers.” Id. at 206. This determination was made in light of 
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Video Pipeline’s use of the clip previews on the internet further 
refined the fair use doctrine and served as a victory for the movie and 
television industries as they attempt to avoid the same battles that the 
music industry has fought. In his testimony before the Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, former Motion Picture Association 
of America (MPAA) President Jack Valenti said “we will not allow 
the movie industry to suffer the pillaging that has been inflicted on 
the music industry.”92 Valenti also acknowledged the MPAA’s efforts 
to avoid future piracy,93 noting that despite its proactive approach, he 
did not envision following the recording industry’s lead in filing 
lawsuits against individuals.94 
the goals of copyright law that seek to prevent “the verbatim copying, lack of creative 
ingenuity, and profit-driven purpose of the clip previews.” Id. at 207. The court affirmed the 
entry of the preliminary injunction, preventing further display of the clip previews on Video 
Pipeline’s website. Id. at 206.  
 92. Privacy & Piracy: The Paradox of Illegal File Sharing on Peer-to-Peer Networks and 
the Impact of Technology on the Entertainment Industry, Hearing Before the Permanent 
Subcomm. on Investigations of Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong. 88–89 (2003) 
(statement of Jack Valenti, President and Chief Executive Officer, MPAA). Valenti noted that 
the industry is already losing approximately $3.5 billion annually through analog and optical 
disc piracy and that approximately 400 to 600 thousand films are illegally spread daily. Id. at 
90–91. Often film pirates use the internet to distribute illegal films made by using camcorders 
in movie theaters. The outlook for continued piracy is bleak for the motion picture industry. For 
example, in 1997, officials apprehended 9.5 million items tied to piracy, and in 2002, there 
were over 58.2 million items seized, representing an increase of 510% over five years. MOTION 
PICTURE INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, 2003 PIRACY FACT SHEET OVERVIEW (2003), 
at http://mpaa.org/piracyfactsheets/piracyfactsheetoverview.pdf. For a more comprehensive 
look at piracy issues facing the motion picture industry, including ten countries with greater 
incidence of piracy, see MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY OF AMERICA, MPA WORLDWIDE MARKET 
RESEARCH (Dec. 2003), available at http://mpaa.org/piracyfactsheets/content.htm. 
Additionally, the MPAA launched a “Contact/Reward” program to encourage those with 
knowledge of suspected video piracy operations to report such activities. See Motion Picture 
Association of America, Contact/Reward Program, at http://mpaa.org/anti-piracy/contact (last 
visited Mar. 20, 2005). Awards are available to those who report activities that result in either a 
conviction of a person involved with video piracy or the discovery of a video piracy lab that 
contains over thirty VCRs. Id. 
 93. Among these efforts, the MPAA has launched educational efforts aimed at educating 
the public as well as technological research to serve as a countermeasure to digital piracy. See 
Patrick Goldstein, Hollywood Deals With Piracy, A Wary Eye on CDs, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9, 
2003, at E1. The members of the MPAA also launched Respect Copyrights, an organization 
dedicated to educating the public in copyright law, piracy, and the dangers faced by the motion 
picture industry. See Respect Copyrights, Who We Are, at http://www.respectcopyright.org/ 
whoweare.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2004); A.O. Scott, These Are Your Movies on Piracy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 16, 2003, at 15. 
 94. Instead, the movie industry has sent hundreds of thousands of cease-and-desist emails 
to people who downloaded illegal movies. See Schwartz, supra note 5, at C1. Jack Valenti, 
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III. COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT AND THE INTERNET 
The issue of copyright infringement on the internet gained, and 
continues to gain, national attention due to the plight of the recording 
industry. Although the recording industry achieved a major victory 
with its shutdown of Napster,95 the industry is still in the midst of 
considerable amounts of litigation with its attempt to sue schools, 
individuals, and other internet web pages that permit the trading of 
music files.96 Because these lawsuits are in their early phases, it is 
citing the backlash of public opinion against the record industry as an influential factor, stated 
that “I’m not ruling out anything, but at this moment we don’t have any specific plans to sue 
anyone. . . . I think we have learned from the music industry.” Id. 
 95. In 2001, Napster, an extremely popular online music swapping service, went bankrupt 
after a federal judge found the company guilty of copyright infringement. See A & M Records, 
Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Matt Richtel, Upheaval at 
Bertelsmann May End Plans for Acquisition of Napster, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2002, at C1.  
 96. While a full history of the record industry’s fight against illegal file sharing is beyond 
the scope of this Note, the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), the record 
industry’s trade organization and major lobbyist, has been involved with litigation against file-
swapping services Napster, Morpheus, Grokster, and others. See A & M Records, Inc., 239 F.3d 
at 1004; Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), 
cert. granted, 73 U.S.L.W. 3350 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2004) (No. 04-480). Additionally, the RIAA 
sued over 261 individual file-sharers in September 2003. Amy Harmon, The Price of Music: 
The Overview; 261 Lawsuits Filed on Music Sharing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2003, at A1. In 
attempt to sue more individual file sharers, the RIAA issued subpoenas against several major 
internet service providers asking for the names of individual infringers. The subpoenas are 
available to the RIAA under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which compels internet 
service providers to turn over the names of individual file swappers without the signature of a 
judge. Id.; see 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000); see also Amy Harmon, In Court, Verizon Challenges 
Music Industry’s Subpoenas, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2003, at C2. RIAA also issued subpoenas to 
over ten universities seeking the names of student file-swappers. Vivian Marino, Campus Eye 
on Music Swapping, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2003, Business, at 10. The RIAA suffered a setback 
when the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the subpoena provision of the 
Digital Millenium Copyright Act is inapplicable to those internet service providers that act 
“only as a conduit for data transferred between two internet users, such as persons sending and 
receiving e-mail or . . . sharing P2P files.” Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon 
Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 309 (2004). 
Despite this, the RIAA remains steadfast in its attempt to curb copyright infringement on the 
internet. See Press Release, Comment of Cary Sherman, President, Recording Industry 
Association of America, RIAA on Verizon Appeals Court Decision (Dec. 19, 2003), available 
at http://riaa.com/news/newsletter/121903.asp (“We can and will continue to file copyright 
infringement lawsuits against illegal file sharers.”). In its third round of lawsuits, the RIAA 
filed another 532 lawsuits against potential copyright infringers utilizing the “John Doe” 
subpoena. John Schwartz, Music Industry Returns to Court, Altering Tactics on File Sharing, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2004 at C2. As of January 2005, the RIAA had filed over 7,300 “John 
Doe” lawsuits. See Peter Shinkle, Court Says Judge Erred in Charter Music Case, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 6, 2005, at C1. 
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difficult to determine how successful the recording industry will be.97 
Some data suggests that the lawsuits successfully act as a scare tactic, 
although other data shows that there has been a substantial increase in 
the number of music downloads.98 With the increase in peer-to-peer 
file sharing or collective models for sharing information, some doubt 
that the recording industry can subsist with technology advances.99  
Despite its initial reluctance to file lawsuits against sharers of 
copyrighted film, the MPAA filed two recent waves of lawsuits. The 
first round sought civil damages from individuals that illegally shared 
copyrighted films,100 and the second brought criminal charges against 
individuals, both domestically and abroad, who have used file-
sharing programs to enable pirates to download movies.101 
The movie and television industries are also acting proactively by 
lobbying Congress and the FCC for technological advancements to 
 97. The Supreme Court will decide later this year, see Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 
Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 73 U.S.L.W. 3350 (U.S. 
Dec. 10, 2004) (No. 04-480) whether to hold online service providers liable for copyright 
infringement where such services are used by users to violate copyrights. See Linda 
Greenhouse, Justices Agree to Hear Case on File Sharing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2004, at C1. 
Although the case will focus on peer-to-peer services (those that enable users to exchange files 
directly without holding the files themselves), the holding will serve as one of the most 
important copyright cases since the 1984 ruling that held that makers of VCRs were not 
infringing copyrights when VCR owners made copies at home. See supra note 88. 
 98. See Pew Internet & American Life Project, Pew Internet Project and Comscore Media 
Metrix Data Memo (Jan. 2004), at http://www.pewinternet.org/reports/pdfs/pip_file_swapping_ 
memo_0104.pdf. In its research, Pew looked at the effects of the RIAA lawsuits on music file 
sharers. Pew estimates that during March to May and November to December 2003, the 
percentage of people downloading music files dropped from twenty-nine percent (thirty-five 
million total) to fourteen percent (eighteen million total). Moreover, “a fifth of those who say 
that they continue to download or share files say they are doing so less often because of the 
suits.” Id.; see also John Schwartz, In Survey, Fewer Are Sharing Files Or Admitting It, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 5, 2004, at C1. Other internet marketing research groups determined that there was 
actually an increase in the downloading of music files after the RIAA lawsuits, a rise of six 
percent in October 2003 and a rise of seven percent in November 2003. Id. For a comparison of 
the studies, see Brian Hindo, Music Pirates: Still on Board, BUS. WK., Jan. 26, 2004, at 13.  
 99. See Boynton, supra note 6, at 42–46. Yale law professor Yochai Benkler states, “All 
[the recording industry] does is package and sell goods . . . which is technically an unfeasible 
way of continuing. They are trying their best to legislate the environment to change, but that 
doesn’t mean we have to let them.” Id. at 45. 
 100. See Frank Ahrens, MPAA to Sue Over Movie File Sharing; Industry Following the 
Lead of Music Companies, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 2004, at E1.  
 101. See Jube Shiver Jr., MPAA Steps Up War on Piracy, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2004, at 
C3.  
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limit future piracy.102 In 2003, the FCC passed rules requiring an anti-
piracy device for digital broadcast televisions.103 Hailed by the movie 
and television industries as a major achievement,104 these rules 
prevent mass distribution of digital programs over the internet.105 
However, critics of the rules, mainly those of consumer advocacy 
groups, believe that the rule will prohibit consumers from making at-
home recordings of flagged programs and will prevent the 
distribution of video clips that belong in the public domain.106  
 102. During 2004, the MPAA lobbied heavily for the following bills: a bill that would 
make it a felony to make an unauthorized videotape of a movie while in a movie theatre and 
that would lower the applicable standard for copyright infringement, Piracy Deterrence and 
Education Act of 2004, H.R. 4077, 108th Cong. (2004), a bill that would make it illegal to 
“intentionally induce” others to break copyright law, Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act 
of 2004, S. 2560, 108th Cong. (2004), and a bill that would allow the Justice Department to file 
civil lawsuits against copyright infringers, Protecting Intellectual Rights Against Theft and 
Expropriation Act of 2004, S. 2237, 108th Cong. (2004). See generally Press Releases, Motion 
Picture Association of America, available at http://mpaa.org/mpaapress (last visited Feb. 13, 
2005). The MPAA also opposed a bill that would provide an affirmative right for individuals to 
fast-forward or skip over parts of a videotape. See Testimony of Jack Valenti Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the House Judiciary Comm. on 
the “Family Movie Act of 2004” (June 17, 2004), available at http://www.mpaa.org/mpaapress. 
 103. Digital Broad Content Protection, 18 F.C.C.R. 23,550 (2003). The FCC rule calls for 
an adoption of “the broadcast flag” for insertion into digital broadcast television by 2005. This 
mechanism is “a digital code that can be embedded into a digital broadcasting stream.” Press 
Release, Federal Communications Commission, FCC Adopts Anti-Piracy Protection for Digital 
TV 3 (Nov. 4, 2003), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/ attachmatch/DOC-
240759A1.pdf. The new rule only affects “products that are capable of receiving DTV signals 
over-the-air,” which does not include “[o]ther products such as digital VCRs, DVD players and 
personal computers that are not built with digital tuners.” Id. at 1. Existing television and video 
equipment will also not be affected by the new rules. The broadcaster of the program maintains 
discretion over the use of the broadcast flag in blocking programming. Id. 
 104. Stephen Labaton, F.C.C. Acts Against Pirating of TV Broadcasts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 
2003, at C1. MPAA President Jack Valenti commented, “The FCC scored a big victory for 
consumers and the preservation of high value over-the-air free broadcasting with its decision on 
the Broadcast Flag. This puts digital TV on the same level playing field as cable and satellite 
delivery. All the way around, the consumer wins, and free TV stays alive.” Press Release, 
Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Statement by Jack Valenti on the Broadcast Flag (Nov. 4, 2003), 
available at http://mpaa.org/jack. 
 105. See Digital Broad. Content Prot., 18 F.C.C.R. 23,550. In citing the proactive nature 
and purpose of the rule, the report stated that “[a]lthough the threat of widespread 
indiscriminate retransmission of high value digital broadcast content is not imminent, it is 
forthcoming and preemptive action is needed to forestall any potential harm to the viability of 
over-the-air television.” Id. at 23,557. 
 106. Id. at 23,557–58. The proposed rule drew dissenting comments from both 
Commissioner Michael J. Copps and Commissioner Jonathan S. Adelstein. Id. at 23,615–21. 
Copps emphasized that the broadcast flag will prohibit the dissemination of valuable news and 
information services. Additionally, Copps voiced concerns about the ability of the broadcast 
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In contrast to the entertainment industries, those who advocate a 
more liberal application of copyright laws argue that copyright 
privileges were never intended to function as an absolute property 
right.107 Others argue that instead of expanding the public domain, the 
proper response to the issues raised within traditional copyright law 
by the internet is to create a regulated and licensed system that may 
virtually eliminate the concept of the public domain.108 
flag to track personal information about the viewers’ habits. Id. at 23,616–17. Adelstein 
expressed concern that widespread restriction of programming would limit public 
accountability. Id. at 23,620. The constitutionality of the broadcast flag is currently being 
challenged by a lawsuit filed by nine public interest organizations, including the American 
Library Association, the Consumers Union, and the Electronic Frontier Foundation. See Press 
Release, Public Knowledge, FCC Has No “Unbridled Power” to Create Broadcast Flag (Dec. 3, 
2004), available at http://publicknowledge.org/pressroom/releases/pr120304.  
 107. See James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?, 
47 DUKE L.J. 87 (1997). Boyle argues that “since there is no ‘natural’ absolute intellectual 
property right, the doctrines which favor consumers and other users, such as fair use, are just as 
much a part of the basic right as the entitlement of the author to prevent certain kinds of 
copying.” Id. at 105. Boyle suggests that “there is something larger going on under the 
realpolitik of land-grabs by Disney and campaign contributions by the Recording Industry of 
America.” Id. at 112. Highlighting the influence of the entertainment and software industries 
over copyright legislation and public opinion, Boyle calls for a new public discourse concerning 
the costs and benefits of heightened copyright protection versus a broadened public domain. Id. 
at 113–14.  
 108. See Tom W. Bell, Fair-Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights 
Management on Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557 (1998). Bell envisions 
digitalized and widespread licensing. Every use of a copyrighted material comes through 
“automated rights management” (ARM) in which the copyright owner governs the use of the 
copyrighted material automatically. Id. at 559–60. With automated rights management, 
copyright owners maintain heightened control over the material through licensing. Bell argues 
that with the widespread use of automatic rights management, “ARM threatens to reduce 
radically the scope of the fair use defense to copyright infringement. ARM will interact with 
existing legal doctrines to supplant fair use with an analogous but distinctly different doctrine: 
fared use.” Id. at 560–61. Bell also cites a number of benefits from ARM, including the 
reduction of transaction costs throughout the market for copyrighted expression, the creation of 
“harbors safe from the threat of copyright litigation,” and the increase in the value of the 
copyrighted work. Id. at 587–89. Other commentators question the viability of traditional 
copyright law given the nature of the internet. See John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas, 
WIRED, Mar. 1994, available at http://wired.com/wired/archive/2.03/economy.ideas.html. 
Barlow states that: 
Intellectual property law cannot be patched, retrofitted, or expanded to contain 
digitized expression any more than real estate law might be revised to cover the 
allocation of broadcasting spectrum (which, in fact, rather resembles what is being 
attempted here). We will need to develop an entirely new set of methods as befits this 
entirely new set of circumstances. 
Id. 
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Still others argue that copyright provides an impetus for fostering 
creativity, and copyright analysis must focus on the author.109 The 
protection of the author and her creative works has become largely 
absent from the argument for heightened copyright measures.110 
Instead, copyright protection has become symbolized by corporate 
greed from industries that rely heavily on copyright protections.111 
Despite these calls for heightened or decreased copyright protection, 
the reality is that the internet and its new intricacies raise new issues 
that challenge standard copyright protection.112 
 Barlow is a fellow of the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School, a 
research hub dedicated to understanding the internet and helping to shape its direction in the 
future. See Mission, Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School, at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/home/mission (last visited Feb. 13, 2005). Although the ideologies 
of the contributors to the Berkman Center vary, they share a common fear that the copyright 
system in the United States currently squelches creativity instead of encouraging it in 
accordance with its constitutional purpose. See Boynton, supra note 6, at 40. Led by Professor 
Lawrence Lessig, members of the Berkman Center founded Creative Commons, an 
organization that enables copyright owners to levy the level of control they retain over their 
works. Id. at 44. Copyright owners that do not want full copyright protection for their works 
may “dedicate their work to the public domain or license it on terms that allow copying and 
creative reuses.” Id. For the philosophical basis for the Creative Commons, see Lawrence 
Lessig, Dunwoody Distinguished Lecture in Law, The Creative Commons, address at the 
University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of Law (Apr. 26, 2002), in 55 FLA. L. REV. 763 
(2003). For a response to Lessig’s ideas, see Jeffrey L. Harrison, Dunwoody Commentary: 
Creativity or Commons: A Comment on Professor Lessig, 55 FLA. L. REV. 795 (2003). 
 109. See Jane C. Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law, 52 
DEPAUL L. REV. 1063 (2003). Emphasizing an international perspective on copyright, Ginsburg 
argues that copyright must exist to protect an individual’s autonomy over her creation. Id. at 
1064. While financial and recognitional protection is important, authors are entitled to a certain 
level of continued artistic control over their works. Id.  
 The Supreme Court upheld the statutory expansion of the term recognized before a 
copyrighted work falls into the public domain. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003), 
reh’g denied, 538 U.S. 916 (2003). Eldred upheld the constitutionality of the Sonny Bono 
Copyright Term Extension Act. The Act extended the duration of copyright protection from the 
life of the author plus fifty years to the life of the author plus seventy years. See 17 U.S.C. 
§ 302(a) (2000). The Act extended the copyright term for works made-for-hire, a scheme 
typically used by businesses and corporate entities, to ninety-five years after publication. Id.; 
see also Shalisha Francis, Eldred v. Ashcroft: How Artists and Creators Finally Got Their Due, 
2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 14 (2003). Francis argues that the extension of the copyright term 
is “long overdue” and “virtually essential to allowing copyright owners to obtain their just due.” 
Id. at 20. 
 110. Ginsburg, supra note 109, at 1067–68. Ginsburg’s argument relies on the conception 
of moral rights that vest in the author of a work. Id.  
 111. Id.  
 112. See Boynton, supra note 6, at 43. Benkler states, “each major innovation in the history 
of communications—the printing press, radio, telephone—was followed by a period of 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE VIDEO PIPELINE DECISION 
The Third Circuit’s Video Pipeline decision is a reasonable and 
proper limitation on the fair use doctrine. First, while Video Pipeline 
portrayed its clip previews as serving an indexing function like that 
served by research guides, the court’s decision is reconcilable with 
the Seventh and Ninth Circuit’s fair use findings regarding research 
guides.113 If Video Pipeline’s goal was to provide an indexing service 
for movies, it used too much of the copyrighted material to serve this 
purpose. Like in Ty, Inc. v. Publications International Ltd., where the 
defendant only copied the minimum amount of material necessary to 
produce a functional collectors’ guide,114 Video Pipeline could have 
provided an indexing service based only on factual attributes about 
the movie. In doing so, Video Pipeline would have created an 
indexing service without using copyrighted elements.115  
Second, the holding is consistent with prior case law governing 
fair use and the internet.116 Given the fair use doctrine’s purposes, the 
two critical factors of fair use analysis in Video Pipeline were the first 
and fourth ones—the purpose and character of the use and the effect 
on the potential market or value.117 
Video Pipeline’s purpose in using the clips was to make a profit. 
This purpose failed to advance any of the basic reasons for the fair 
use exception, like the informational function found in Kelly v. 
Arriba Soft Corp.,118 or the parodic commentaries found in Mattel, 
Inc. v. Walking Mountain Products119 and Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
openness before the rules of its usage were determined and alternatives eliminated.” Benkler 
believes that the internet is currently in this period. Id.  
 113. See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003); Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l 
Ltd., 292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 114. 292 F.3d at 515–24. 
 115. The Kelly court did not address Posner’s central question of whether Arriba Soft only 
copied what was necessary to produce a marketable guide. 336 F.3d at 821. However, this 
inquiry is likely the result of the fact that Arriba Soft’s search engine did not harm the market 
for Kelly’s product. See id. at 821–22. In contrast to products in Video Pipeline and Ty, Arriba 
did not produce a product that stood in direct market competition against the original work. Id. 
 116. See Kelly, 336 F.3d 811; Michaels, 5 F. Supp. 2d 823. 
 117. See Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 198–200 (3d 
Cir. 2003), for the first factor and see id. at 202–03 for the fourth value. 
 118. See Kelly, 336 F.3d at 820. 
 119. See Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 803–06 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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Music, Inc.120 Given cases where courts have found fair use when the 
new work is significantly transformative, one could conceive of a 
situation where a defendant splices together edited video clips in a 
creative fashion to make an artistic or parodic commentary. Here, 
however, there was no intent to add expressive or transformative 
aspects to the excerpts.121 
Moreover, the video clips put Video Pipeline in direct competition 
with Disney. Disney made a profit from licensing its previews to 
third parties.122 Even though the primary demand is for the full-length 
movies, Disney could still market its previews to third parties, as 
evidenced by Video Pipeline’s own success in selling the clip 
previews.123  
Third, the court’s holding is consistent with the purposes of the 
Copyright Act and the fair use doctrine.124 Fair use protects the public 
domain from which artists and creators may draw ideas. It enables 
people to research, comment on, and criticize copyrighted works 
without fear of harsh sanctions.125 The fair use doctrine does not 
serve as a mechanism for infringers to sample copyrighted work for 
commercial gain. Although arguments for permitting a more lenient 
standard to govern the internet126 are valid, such arguments are 
inapplicable to a case like Video Pipeline, where the infringer’s only 
purpose was to profit off the direct copying of the copyright holder’s 
work. 
Video Pipeline serves as a victory for the entertainment industry. 
In protecting Disney’s copyrighted excerpts, the court effectively 
prevented any person or entity from putting excerpts of videotapes on 
the internet without a license from the copyright holder (assuming 
that the clip is unaccompanied by expressive elements or 
commentary).127 If this protection is expanded, it could likely lead to 
 120. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 510 U.S. 569, 590–91 (1994). 
 121. See Video Pipeline, 342 F.3d at 199–200. It is important to consider the lack of intent 
to transform the copyrighted work. Video Pipeline did not argue that its clip previews served as 
a form of artistic or parodic commentary. Id. 
 122. Id. at 202–03. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 127. If commentary or expressive elements were added to the excerpts, there would be a 
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strict copyright protection over any visual image from a copyrighted 
film, like a photograph or a film still.  
While Video Pipeline’s holding helps combat the piracy problems 
faced by the movie industry, it also enables movie producers and 
studios to cut out the distributor for online sales. Eliminating the 
distributor permits film studios to market and exercise greater control 
over the sales of their films via the internet.128 This is particularly 
important given new attempts to directly distribute content via the 
internet.129 If the movie industry continues to follow in the footsteps 
of the recording industry, direct online distribution methods, like 
iTunes or other forms of automated rights management,130 may 
increase as a mechanism for distributing the movie industry’s 
content.131 
PROPOSAL 
The holding in Video Pipeline reflects the broader tension 
between a strict copyright enforcement scheme based on licenses and 
less stringent regulations that expand the public domain.132 To 
balance the necessity of protecting intellectual property rights and the 
need for a rich public domain for future creation of new works, courts 
should continue to adapt present fair use standards to the internet; 
however, given the new issues that emerge with the internet, 
Congress should take additional measures to further enhance the 
public domain. 
While it is too early to judge the success of automated rights 
management, early indications show that strict licensing and 
regulation over the internet and pay-per-use financing will provide 
the dominant form of distributing copyrighted works in the future.133 
greater likelihood that a court would find such use to be fair. 
 128. See Diane See Morrison, Hands Off Our Clips, GUARDIAN, Aug. 13, 2001, at 32.  
 129. Id.  
 130. See Bell, supra note 108, at 559–61.  
 131. See supra notes 105–06 and accompanying text. Apple introduced iTunes in the fall of 
2003. iTunes permits users to download individual songs or record albums for a set fee. See 
Boynton, supra note 6, at 40. 
 132. See supra text accompanying notes 127–31. 
 133. In its first fiscal quarter of 2004, Apple sold over thirty million songs through its 
iTunes service. John Markoff, Apple’s Success with iPod May Presage the Ascendance of 
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This heavily licensed system of rights management may bring profit 
and extensive control to the entertainment industry, which has been 
criticized greatly for its corporate greed and its attempts to control 
legislation. Despite the potential for greater profits for the 
entertainment industry, automated rights management systems still 
advance the constitutional aim of promoting the progress of 
authors.134 This form of licensing protects the interests of individual 
authors by ensuring that the appropriate royalties are collected for 
each individual download. While entertainment officials are the most 
outspoken of those entitled to protection, copyright protects the 
interests of all individual authors, including those who would not be 
able to create without the payment of copyright royalties.135 
Automated rights management systems would help protect all 
copyright holders, not just those with influential lobbying efforts. 
Automated rights management limits the availability of source 
material in the public domain. Yet, Congress can take measures to 
encourage the availability of source materials from the public domain 
without limiting traditional access to copyright protection. It can fund 
organizations like the Creative Commons that encourage authors to 
dedicate their works to the public domain.136 In addition to providing 
direct funding for such organizations, Congress could also offer tax 
credits or other incentives to authors who donate their works to the 
public domain. Such an inducement will help offset some of the 
author’s economic loss that she forfeits by donating her work to the 
public domain. The success of the Creative Commons proves that 
some authors are willing to experiment with communal forms of 
protection.137  
Additionally, the Library of Congress can sponsor a 
comprehensive database detailing those works that are in the public 
domain. Similar to Google’s plan to digitize the holdings of a number 
of large libraries,138 the Library of Congress could offer its vast 
Hardware Over Software, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2004, at C4.  
 134. See Ginsburg, supra note 109.  
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See John Markoff & Edward Wyatt, Google Is Adding Major Libraries to Its 
Database, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2004, at A1. 
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collection to the public on the internet. Finally, Congress should not 
limit its efforts to the domestic sphere; instead, it should provide an 
international database of works in the public domain or create an 
organization that encourages authors from around the globe to donate 
their works to the public domain. Because all of these databases and 
organizations could be accessed through the internet, the major costs 
associated with the database would derive from the establishment and 
maintenance of a web page. 
CONCLUSION 
Video Pipeline serves as an appropriate limitation on the extension 
of fair use to the internet. The holding is consistent with previous 
doctrine concerning fair use, and it reflects the fact that traditional 
copyright laws and the fair use doctrine can successfully protect the 
rights of authors despite new challenges presented by the internet. 
Although this continued protection may ultimately lead to a system of 
strict rights management benefiting the entertainment industry, the 
government can and should take affirmative measures to expand the 
public domain.  
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